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ABSTRACT
We estimate the factors determining specialization of crop choice at the level of individual fields, distinguishing
between the role of natural advantage (soil characteristics) and economies of density (scale economies
achieved when farmers plant neighboring fields with the same crop).  Using rich geographic data from
North Dakota, including new data on crop choice collected by satellite, we estimate the analog of a
social interactions econometric model for the planting decisions on neighboring fields.  We find that
planting decisions on a field are heavily dependent on the soil characteristics of the neighboring fields.
Through this relationship, we back out the structural parameters of economies of density.  Setting an
Ellison-Glaeser dartboard level of specialization as a benchmark, we find that of the actual level of
specialization achieved beyond this benchmark, approximately two-thirds can be attributed to natural
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A basic principle in economics is that a particular location may specialize in a particular
activity for two broadly-deﬁned reasons. First, the location might have some underlying
characteristic that gives it a natural advantage in the activity. Second, some type of scale
economy may be attained by concentrating (or agglomerating) production at the location.
When we observe specialization, we can ask about the roles these two factors play. For
example, Chicago became a major city because of its specialization as a transportation
hub. How much credit is due to its natural advantage (through its access to Lake Michigan
and the Chicago River), and how much is due to agglomeration beneﬁts? (See Cronon
(1991) on this issue.) Los Angeles specializes in making movies. How much of this is
due to locational advantages (the weather, quick access to mountains and beaches, the large
number of beautiful people who live in the area), and how much to agglomeration beneﬁts?
We tackle the question of why a location specializes in a setting where the geographic
scale is extremely narrow and the issues are illustrated in stark terms. We look at crop
choice on 160-acre square parcels of farmland called quarter sections. We observe that the
various ﬁelds within a quarter section tend to be planted the same way and ask: How much
of this specialization is due to natural advantage and how much is due to scale economies?
Obviously, natural conditions like soil quality and topography play key roles in deter-
m i n i n gw h a ti sp l a n t e d . I n d e e d ,a g r i c u l t u r ei st h et e x t b o o kc a s ef o rt h er o l et h a tn a t u r a l
factors can play in the location of economic activity. Adjacent ﬁelds will tend to be similar
in attributes like soil quality and topography and for this reason it is no surprise to see
adjacent ﬁelds planted similarly.
Perhaps more subtly, scale economies also can also lead nearby ﬁelds to be planted
similarly. When a farmer is out in a ﬁeld and has just run a particular piece of equipment,
the farmer can economize on setup costs by continuing on to the next ﬁeld, treating it the
same way. Potential eﬃciencies extend beyond day-to-day ﬁeld operations and include
economies involving specialized equipment, like a sugar beet harvester. When a farmer
acquires expensive equipment like this, the farmer needs to use the equipment on many
acres to justify its expense and ensure it gets suﬃcient utilization. So if the farmer includes
sugar beets in the crop rotation for one ﬁeld, the farmer will have an incentive to include
sugar beets in the rotation of the neighboring ﬁelds. (We have more to say about crop
rotation in Section 2.) The issue of indivisibility applies to the farmer as well. Farmers can
have specialized knowledge that is crop speciﬁc. If a ﬁeld is planted with a certain crop that
beneﬁts from a particular kind of farmer knowledge, it will be advantageous for neighboring
ﬁelds to be planted the same way to fully utilize the farmer’s particular knowledge.In standard concepts of scale economies there is no notion of geography; cost savings
are achieved by increasing scale at a particular point. With the scale economies considered
here, there is a notion of geography. Expanding a particular activity at one point (i.e.,
the planting of a particular crop on a particular ﬁe l d )m a k e si ta d v a n t a g e o u st oe x p a n dt h e
activity at neighboring points (the neighboring ﬁelds). We use the term density economies
to distinguish this type of scale economies from the standard kind. We follow the literature
in using this terminology, as we explain below.
We are drawn to study the factors underlying agglomeration in agriculture because the
features of this industry allow for a particularly clean analysis. Agriculture is a unique
industry in terms of the extent to which it is possible to get a handle on the natural land
characteristics that determine natural advantage, such as the soil type, the slope of the land,
and moisture. Moreover, agriculture is a unique industry in terms of the extent to which
the crucial location characteristics can be taken as exogenous, since it is mainly dependent
on natural factors. The movie industry in Los Angeles beneﬁts from its large supply of
beautiful people, but this characteristic depends upon the decisions of people to move there.
Our analysis will rely heavily on comparing the characteristics of neighboring ﬁelds. In most
related contexts, we would need to worry about a selection process for neighbors, with the
underlying units of analysis choosing who their neighbors are. But a ﬁeld cannot pick itself
up and move around to select its neighbors.1 Glacial activity determined the characteristics
of a ﬁeld’s neighbors long ago.
Before discussing results, we say a little more about our data. We focus on the long-run
average planting decisions in the Red River Valley region of North Dakota. We picked a
narrow geographic area because of computational considerations. The fertile Red River
Valley is ideal for our purposes because many years of crop data are available for this area
a n db e c a u s eaw i d ev a r i e t yo fc r o p sa r ep l a n t e di nt h ea r e a ,m a k i n gt h ea n a l y s i so fw h i c hc r o p
to plant interesting. Detailed maps of land characteristics make it possible to determine
how characteristics vary throughout a quarter section (again, a 160-acre square parcel). We
combine this data with newly available maps of crop choice. Analogous to the data in
Burchﬁeld et al. (2006), our data are based on pictures from the sky (satellite imagery), and
no conﬁdentiality restrictions impede us from determining how a farmer is planting individual
quarter sections. In short, with the choice of this setting, we cleanly measure both the crucial
location characteristics and the activity choices at high geographic resolution.
We now provide some background about quarter sections. A quarter section is the
land unit that was distributed for free through the 1862 Homestead Act to individuals who
1See Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) for an example of a paper in the social interactions literature that
has to confront a situation in which neighbors are endogenous.
2promised to settle and farm the land. It is one-half mile on each side, so the area is a quarter
square mile. A virtually perfect grid of squares over North Dakota (and many other states)
was laid out in the early 1800s. A quarter section can be subdivided into quarter quarters
of forty acres each, which we call ﬁelds. The reader may be familiar with the terms “back
forty” and “front forty,” which refer to these units. We aggregate our data to the level of
these forty-acre ﬁelds and study the joint planting decisions of the four ﬁelds of a quarter
section.
We turn now to our results. In the reduced form of the structural model, if density
economies matter, the planting decision on a ﬁeld depends not only on the soil characteristics
of the given ﬁeld, but also on the soil characteristics of neighboring ﬁelds. We ﬁnd strong
evidence of this link between neighbors. We estimate that for most crops, the weight placed
on a ﬁeld’s neighbors is on the order of one-third, compared to two-thirds on the ﬁeld’s
own characteristics. With the structural parameter estimates in hand, we can determine
what would happen to plantings if we were to shut down density economies across ﬁelds for
a particular crop. We estimate that long-run planting levels of the particular crop would
typically fall on the order of 40 percent.
Using our estimates we can also quantify the factors leading to crop specialization by
quarter sections within counties. That is, why we might see all four ﬁelds of one quarter
section planted with wheat, and in another quarter section within the same county, all
four ﬁelds planted with corn. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) have shown that any analysis
of geographic concentration with “small numbers” needs to take into account that some
concentration can emerge from “dartboard reasons.” In our analysis of specialization of
quarter sections, we have a small numbers issue because there are only four ﬁelds. Consider
the following extreme model of crop planting within a county. Suppose there are no density
economies and that the crop suitability of particular ﬁelds is independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) across the county, analogous to randomly throwing darts labeled “corn”
and darts labeled “wheat” at a county map. By chance, this process will result in some
quarter sections with all four ﬁelds that are wheat and other quarter sections with all four
ﬁelds that are corn. We are interested in concentration emerges beyond that occuring by
chance.
We expect that land is not i.i.d. across a county; rather, there is likely to be geographic
autocorrelation, since a natural event such as a glacial river or lake extends over a wider
area than a single ﬁeld. Because of such a process, ﬁelds that are near each other–in
particular, those in the same quarter sections–will tend to specialize in the same crops
because they will have similar soils. Further, there is specialization in the same crop by the
four ﬁelds in a quarter section because of density economies. In Ellison and Glaeser (1997),
3concentration beyond the dartboard level through natural advantage and increasing returns
is formally equivalent. But here–with our structural estimates of the density economy
technology parameters and our estimates of the soil quality of each ﬁeld–natural advantage
and increasing returns can be distinguished. We take the dartboard level of concentration
as a benchmark and decompose the contribution of natural advantage and density economies
in determining the degree to which specialization of quarter sections within counties extends
beyond the dartboard level. We estimate that natural advantage goes about two-thirds of
the way. Given our priors of a high degree of geographic autocorrelation in soils, it is not
surprising that the natural advantage contribution is big. We ﬁnd it interesting that the
share accounted for by density economies, about one-third, is as big as it is.
We also address the issue that our results may be driven by correlated eﬀects (in Manski
(1993)’s terminology) lurking in the background. That is, there may not be any connection
in decision making; the adjacent ﬁelds may simply have similar unobserved characteristics
that are not being adequately controlled for. We show that our ﬁndings cannot all be
attributed to correlated eﬀects through a boundary analysis. We ﬁnd that the link between a
ﬁeld’s planting decision and its neighbor’s characteristics is attenuated when the neighboring
ﬁeld is on the other side of one of several kinds of boundaries, including a quarter section
boundary and an ownership or administration boundary. We show that in terms of observed
soil characteristics, neighboring ﬁelds across such boundaries are no more diﬀerent than
neighboring ﬁelds within such boundaries. Since the pattern of observed soil characteristics
does not change at a border, there is no reason to believe the pattern of unobserved soil
characteristics would change either. We conclude that the attenuation of the link between
neighbors is due to a reduction in the magnitude of density economies enjoyed across such
boundaries.
This paper is most closely related to the spatial literature on the economics of industry
location. The focus of much of this literature is determining the relative agglomerating force
of various types of scale economies (e.g., knowledge spillovers), leaving natural advantage
in the background (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey). Ellison and Glaeser
(1999), Rosenthal and Strange (2001), and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) are exceptions
in that they jointly consider the forces of natural advantage and scale economies as we do.
One obvious way their work diﬀers from ours is that they look at manufacturing in all of
the United States, whereas we look at crops in the Red River Valley. Our work also diﬀers
substantively in approach. We take a within-industry approach and estimate a structural
economic model. Their paper takes a cross-industry nonstructural approach. By being very
narrow in our application, we are able to precisely measure natural advantage in a way that
would be impossible in an aggregate analysis of all manufacturing industries in the United
4States.
There is a long-standing interest in measuring economies of scale in farming and esti-
mating farm production functions more generally (see, for example, the survey by Battese
(1992)). For many studies, the primary interest is how average cost changes as farm oper-
ations incorporate more land. Our analysis holds ﬁxed the land margin at the four ﬁelds
of a quarter section, and examines how costs vary when those four ﬁelds are planted more
intensively for a particular crop, i.e., at higher density. This is analogous to the way, with
respect to the airline industry, that Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) distinguish
between an airline increasing the number of routes it serves and increasing the frequency
of ﬂights. They call cost savings from the latter economies of density, and we follow their
terminology.
Holmes (2008) provides a recent analysis of economies of density in Wal-Mart’s store
location problem. The cost saving that Wal-Mart can achieve by locating its stores close
together is conceptually similar to what a farmer can achieve by planting neighboring ﬁelds
the same way. Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) study density economies (networking beneﬁts)
of advertising agencies by analyzing the location pattern of new advertising agencies in
Manhattan. One important way in which our study diﬀers from typical farm productivity
analyses such as those cited in Battese (1992) is that we do not directly observe measures
directly related to productivity, such as bushels of output or labor or capital inputs. Rather,
we see soil conditions and crop choices. It is from the revealed preferences underlying these
choices that we infer density economy parameters. We ﬁnally cite the early study of Johnston
(1972) that discussed cost savings achieved when farmers operate land parcels that are close
together rather than dispersed.
2T h e o r y
We develop a variant of the linear-in-means social interactions model exposited in the survey
paper of Brock and Durlauf (2001b). Papers in this literature study the connection in the
behavior of neighboring decision units. For example, is a person more likely to commit a
crime if his neighbor commits a crime (an “endogenous eﬀect,” in Manski’s terminology)?
An analogous question arises here: Is it more likely that soybeans will be planted in a ﬁeld
if soybeans are planted in an adjacent ﬁeld? Before getting into the details of the model, it
i su s e f u lt or a i s ef o u rp o i n t sa b o u tt h em o d e l .
First, while we motivate the existence of density economies by appealing to the existence
of indivisibilities in the use of specialized capital and gains from plowing the next row over
5the same as the previous one, we don’t explicitly model these various details about farming.
Instead, we capture these forces by writing down a reduced form proﬁt structure where the
proﬁtability of the planting choice on a particular ﬁeld depends on the choices made on
neighboring ﬁelds. In the exercises we consider, estimates of the parameters of this proﬁt
structure are suﬃcient for what we do.
Second, farmers typically pick crop rotations rather than individual crops. For example,
a farmer growing sugar beets would typically only plant beets every four years, rotating in
other crops the other years. One possibility would be sugar beets (year one), wheat (year
two), barley (year three), and wheat (year four). The basic issues that we are interested in
a p p l ye q u a l l yw e l lw h e nt h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ei s a rotation rather than a crop. For example, a
farmer choosing a rotation with sugar beets will need specialized equipment and knowledge
for sugar beets that a farmer choosing a two-year wheat/barley rotation will not need.
Explicitly modeling the underlying agricultural details that lead to crop rotation is beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, we introduce in a reduced-form way an incentive to cycle
in, or out, a particular crop over time.
Third, the various economies we have in mind include those that emerge from daily
operations (e.g. from continuously operating a plow on adjacent ﬁelds) and those that
are longer term in nature (e.g. that involve utilization of long-lived equipment). In our
model, we explicitly diﬀerentiate these short run and long run considerations. However, it
is useful to alert the reader up front that in our estimation, we will be unable to separately
identify these two factors. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on relating planting decisions to
characteristics of adjacent ﬁelds like soil quality. If measurable ﬁeld characteristics varied
over time, we could look at the dynamics of planting decisions to separate out short-run and
long-run considerations. But measurable ﬁeld characteristics are constant over time, so we
are only able to identify the combined eﬀect of short-run and long-run economies. For the
exercises we consider, this is suﬃcient.
Fourth, we simplify by modeling the planting decision of each crop in isolation. Implicitly,
when deciding how much to plant a particular crop, there is an opportunity cost in terms of
other crops that is captured in a reduced form way in the proﬁt function for the particular
crop. In our view, the limitations of this approach are trumped by the beneﬁts, at least for
a ﬁrst cut. In particular, the approach delivers linear policy rules relating long-run average
planting levels to neighboring ﬁeld characteristics. This makes the analysis quite tractable
and enables us to back out a structural interpretation from raw moments of the data.
62.1 Details of the Model
We model the planting decisions on the four quadrants of a square piece of farmland. We
refer to the quadrants as ﬁelds and index them by  ∈ {1234}.T h e ﬁelds are arranged
as illustrated in the following diagram:
1 2
3 4
Fields 2 and 3 are directly adjacent to ﬁeld 1. We call directly adjacent pairs like these A
neighbors. Field 4 is diagonal to ﬁeld 1 and 3 is diagonal to 2; we call such diagonal pairs
B neighbors. In our empirical work, a ﬁeld corresponds to a 40-acre quarter quarter. The
four ﬁelds together make up a 160-acre quarter section.
There are  periods. For each ﬁeld  and period , the farmer chooses .W ei n t e r p r e t
this as the planting level of a particular crop, e.g., the quantity of soybeans planted on ﬁeld
 in period .F o re a c hﬁeld  there is a variable  that determines the long-run suitability
of growing the particular crop. This reﬂects the underlying soil characteristics of ﬁeld .
We will call this the permanent soil quality measure.I n e a c h p e r i o d ,e a c hﬁeld  has a
transient quality measure . As this term can vary over time, it introduces a force in the
model to induce the farmer to cycle the planting of the crop, e.g. practice crop rotation.
We do not impose any restriction on how the  change over time or on the correlation of
the  across ﬁelds at a particular time. We do assume, without loss of generality, that




O v e r a l lq u a l i t ya tap o i n ti nt i m ei st h es u m +  of the permanent and transient
components. Since the  sum to zero for each , the long-run average equality of ﬁeld 
equals .
Given the vector of the  and the matrix of the , the farmer faces the problem of






where for simplicity we are ignoring discounting.
7The speciﬁcation of the  is a key step. Assume that the proﬁto nﬁeld 1 in period 
c a nb ew r i t t e na s































for ¯  =(
P
 ). The proﬁto nt h eo t h e rﬁelds is the symmetric equivalent to (2).2
Observe ﬁrst that the proﬁto nﬁeld 1 depends upon its own ﬁeld characteristic and its
own plantings: permanent soil quality 1 and transient quality 1, current planting 1,
and long run average planting ¯ 1. The interaction of 1 with ¯ 1 captures any long-run scale
economy that might arise from planting the same ﬁeld the same way over time. If the
coeﬃcient 
  0, then plantings on the same ﬁe l di nd i ﬀerent periods are complements;
raising the planting level in one period makes it more proﬁtable to raise planting in all
periods.
The proﬁt also depends upon the interactions of its own planting 1 with the plantings
on the other ﬁelds. Fields 2 and 3 are the A neighbors (i.e., directly adjacent) to ﬁeld






 captures short-run density
economies between adjacent ﬁelds. If 

  0, then plantings on adjacent ﬁelds in the same
period are complements. 

 captures long-run density economies between adjacent ﬁelds. If


  0, then plantings on adjacent ﬁelds in diﬀerent periods are complements. Field 4 is









 have the analogous roles for diagonal neighbors. Note the coeﬃcients of
12 on the quadratic terms are a normalization on the units of proﬁt that we impose without









 as the long run density economy parameters.
Proﬁto nﬁeld  does not directly depend upon the soil quality characteristic  of a
neighboring ﬁeld . So this speciﬁcation zeroes out what are variously called exogenous
or contextual eﬀects.3 The proﬁto nﬁeld  indirectly depends upon the soil qualities of
2Note that in the choice of 1, the farmer takes into account not only how 1 impacts its own ﬁeld
proﬁts {11121}, but also how 1 impacts the proﬁts from the other ﬁelds 2, 3, and 4. This diﬀers
from the standard social interaction model where each unit is a separate maximizer, playing a game with
the other units (Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Bajari et al. (2006)). Here, it is not sensible to think of the
back forty as playing a game with the front forty.
3It is possible to think of stories in which exogenous eﬀects might be present as well. For example,
perhaps the characteristics of neighboring ﬁelds aﬀect the likelihood that there will be pests, and the pests
from the neighboring ﬁelds might spill over. As shown by Manski (1993), in linear structures such as this,
endogenous and exogenous eﬀects cannot be separately identiﬁed. Since the latter strike us as second order,
we zero them out a priori.
8neighboring ﬁelds because these qualities inﬂuence the planting levels of the neighboring
ﬁelds, which in turn aﬀect proﬁtability on ﬁeld . T h i si sc a l l e da nendogenous eﬀect in the
literature (Manski (1993)).
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition of problem (1) with respect to 1 (the other ﬁelds
are symmetric) yields
0=(1 + 1) − 1 + 
¯ 1 + 

 (2 + 3)+






Summing up the ﬁrst order conditions over time we obtain
0=















The parameter  combines the long-run and short-run density economies for neighbor type
. It is this parameter that we will go after in the empirical section as we are unable to
separately identify its components.
Solving equation (3) for ﬁeld 1 and corresponding equations for the other ﬁelds, we obtain
the policy function that speciﬁes the average planting on each ﬁeld  as a function of the
vector of permanent ﬁeld qualities (1 2 3 4). The policy function for ﬁeld 1 (the other
ﬁelds are symmetric) is























(1 − 2 − )(1 + 2 − )(1+)
.
9We will refer to , ,a n d as the policy function parameters.T h ep a r a m e t e r is
the coeﬃcient on the ﬁeld’s own quality, and  and  are the coeﬃcients on neighboring
qualities. If the policy function parameters are known, we can work backward and solve for
the three structural parameters 






















We summarize the density economies by deﬁning the composite density parameter Θ as
Θ ≡ 2 + .( 5 )
We provide an interpretation of Θ by showing how the parameter summarizes the impact of a
hypothetical policy experiment shutting down density economies. Imagine a wall is erected
in a particular quarter section that separates all four ﬁelds in the quarter section, eliminating
all potential for density economies. Formally, after the wall, short-run and long-run density










4In our model, there is only one crop with production level . But implicitly when  is low, the land is
being used for something else, an outside alternative. In our experiment as we shut down density economies
for the crop in question, we are leaving matters alone for the outside good.
5For this discussion, we set Θ =0for one particular quarter section, holding it ﬁx e di no t h e rq u a r t e r
sections. Otherwise, this aggregate change in technology might impact prices and ultimately the  parameter
(which can be interpreted as output price).
10Average plantings across the four ﬁelds equals
¯  ≡









1 − 2 − 
















where ¯  is average plantings, ¯  is average quality, and again Θ is the composite density
parameter in (5). We assume that
1 − Θ  0 (8)
as otherwise the density economies are so big that there is no solution. We normalize 
0




=1 .( 9 )
With this normalization, the policy function coeﬃcients sum to 1 (0 +2  +  =1 ).
Suppose that the initial situation is that there is no wall. Given the normalization (9),




When the wall is erected it has the eﬀect of reducing the composite density economies to
zero, Θ =0 , so average planting equals

 = 
0¯  =( 1− Θ)
_.
Thus the composite density parameter has a structural interpretation as the fraction that
average plantings decrease on account of a wall. Note to identify the impact of this policy
experiment, we need not separately identify the short-run and long-run components of density
economies. This follows because both kinds are eliminated by a wall and only the sum
matters.
Density economies not only impact average planting across the four ﬁelds, they also
impact the dispersion of plantings across the four ﬁelds. We use the within quarter section
11variance as our dispersion measure,
 =
P4
=1 (¯  − ¯ )
2
4
.( 1 0 )
It is intuitive that when density economies are substantial, it induces a farmer to plant the
four ﬁelds of a quarter section the same way. Our formal result is,
Proposition 1.S e t  =0and vary Θ over its range [01] by varying .A s Θ varies,
rescale  according to (9) to leave average plantings ﬁx e d . T h ev a r i a n c em e a s u r e(Θ)
strictly declines in Θ a n dg o e st oz e r oa sΘ approaches its theoretical upper bound of 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.¥
Thus as Θ goes to its theoretical upper bound, plantings across the four ﬁelds are equalized.
2.2 The “Within” Specialization Measure
As we will see below, farmers tend to plant the four ﬁelds of a quarter section the same
way. The main task of this paper is to quantify the roles that density economies and natural
advantage play in this specialization. We ﬁrst deﬁne the measure for this specialization and
show how we decompose it into a density economy share and natural advantage share. We
estimate the specialization measure and the shares in the empirical section.
Our specialization measure is based on the dispersion deﬁned in (10) of plantings across
the four ﬁelds within a quarter section. Suppose we have a set of  quarters in an area (let’s
say a county) and let each quarter section be indexed by  =1 . Let the county mean






where  is the planting dispersion of quarter section . The term “within” is included
here to emphasize that dispersion is ﬁrst calculated within each quarter section and then
averaged.
The mean within dispersion measure  is closely related to specialization. When
 it is very small, ﬁelds within a quarter section tend to be planted the same way. As
a benchmark with which to compare , consider a hypothetical exercise where there
are no density economies and no natural advantages. In other words, (1) the planting of an
individual ﬁeld is arbitrarily set to its ﬁeld quality 
 =  and (2) all 4 ﬁelds in the
county are randomly reshuﬄed into groups of four that we call dartboard quarter sections
(as opposed to actual quarter sections). This idea of taking into account random dartboard
factors follows Ellison and Glaeser (1997). In the appendix, we show that if we were to

















The Within Specialization Measure captures the specialization beyond what would happen
with a dartboard. If there are no density economies and if soils are randomly distrib-
uted across ﬁelds (with no tendency for adjacent ﬁelds to be correlated in soil types) then
 =  and the measure  =0 . In this extreme case, there exists zero tendency
for ﬁelds in the same quarter section to be planted the same way (relative to the way other
ﬁelds in the county are planted). At the other extreme case, if the ﬁelds within each quarter
section are planted exactly the same way, then the within specialization measure  =1 .
We focus on the “within” measure because it is jointly determined by the two forces
highlighted in the title of the paper. First, as shown in Proposition 1 above, when density
economies are big, the four ﬁelds will tend to be planted the same way, meaning the within
measure will be big. Second, the natural advantage force will also contribute to making the
within measure big. This follows because we expect the soil qualities within a quarter to
be more highly correlated than across quarters. To decompose the relative importance of
these two factors, deﬁne an intermediate case where the natural advantage factor is taken






=1 ( − ¯ )
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If there are no density economies (Θ =0 ), then _ will equal our overall
within measure  (since  =  in this case). If Θ  0, then density economies also
13contribute. The share of the credit that can be attributed to natural advantage is




while the balance of credit goes to density economies,
Density Economy Share =
 − _

.( 1 2 )
3 Econometric Issues
Rather than observe the scalar quality index , we observe a vector of characteristics 
with  elements for each ﬁeld  on quarter section . A sw ew i l le x p l a i nb e l o w ,t h i sv e c t o r
consists of variables such as dummy variables for soil type and local ground characteristics
such as slope. We assume the following:
 = 
0
 +  (13)
where the weight vector  on characteristics is unknown. Let  ≡ (1 2 3 4) be
the vector of unobserved quality components for quarter section  and analogously  ≡




]=0 .( 1 4 )
To summarize, our assumption here is that there is a vector of soil characteristics  that we
do observe (such as soil and weather variables) and there are other things  that we miss.
And this measurement error  is unrelated to the soil characteristics that we do observe.
Inserting (13) into (4) yields








4 +( 1 +  (2 + 3)+4) (15)
Conceptually, there is no diﬃculty here because we can consistently estimate  and 
jointly with nonlinear least squares. In practice, this estimation approach is diﬃcult when
the dimension of  is large, thereby complicating nonlinear optimization. A convenient
f e a t u r eh e r ei st h a to n c ew eﬁx  ≡ (), the equation is linear in  and we can
14use the ordinary least squares method to calculate the minimum sum of squared errors
conditional on .I ti st h e ne a s y t oﬁnd the  giving the minimum sum of squared errors.
(See Appendix A.3 for how we calculate the standard errors of the estimates obtained with
this method.)
We emphasize that no restriction is imposed on the correlation of the error term across
ﬁelds within a quarter section. In particular, we allow
[0] ≥ 0
for  6= 0. Thus, we allow for correlated eﬀects. It is likely that ﬁe l d si nt h es a m eq u a r t e r
section have an unobservable component of quality that will be correlated across the ﬁelds.
Because of this, even if  =  =0 ,i f¯ 1 were regressed on its own measured soil quality 0
1
and the other planting levels ¯ 2, ¯ 3,a n d¯ 4...¯  , we would expect to see positive coeﬃcients
on the neighboring planting levels. But when we regress ¯ 1 on its own measured soil quality
0
1 and the neighboring measured soil qualities 0
20
30
3,t h ec o e ﬃcients on the latter
will be zero if density economies are zero.
We note that we also get consistent estimates if we allow for measurement error in the
planting variables ¯  that is correlated across neighboring ﬁelds. Correlated measurement
error like this might show up due to clouds blocking the satellite view of neighboring ﬁelds.
4D a t a
Three main data elements are used in our analysis. The ﬁrst element is the boundary
information we use to deﬁne ﬁelds. The second element is data on crop choice. The third
is data on soil and other land characteristics. The analysis in Section 6 uses data on land
ownership and administration, but we defer description of this until later. Our data are
available online.6
4.1 Fields
The Public Land Survey System imposed a grid of squares upon the new lands of the young
United States. The Fifth Principal Meridian governing the origin of the grid for North
Dakota and nearby states was established in 1815 (Committee on Integrated Land Data
Mapping, 1982, p. 14). The grid consists of a hierarchy of diﬀerent size squares. There are
6The link to the data can be found at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/lee/research.html.
15four quarter sections ( h a l fm i l eas i d e )i nasection (one mile a side). There are thirty-six
sections in a township (six miles a side). Figure 1 illustrates the section grid for Pembina
County, one of the counties in North Dakota included in our study.7 The eastern boundary
of the county is irregular, following the Red River. The northern boundary meets Canada,
so the top row is not full height. Otherwise, the section grid is a virtually perfect system of
one-by-one-mile squares.
We will analyze the farmer’s problem at the quarter section level, dividing it up into the
four quarter quarters that we call ﬁelds. A ﬁeld is 40 acres or 1/16 of a square mile. Our
crop and soil data are at a higher resolution than the ﬁeld level and we could, in principle,
have allowed for smaller decision making units, e.g. quarter quarter quarter sections of 10
acres. Our motivation for aggregating up to the 40 acre ﬁeld level is that it makes the
analysis tractable and interpretable.
We study crop choice in the North Dakota Red River region. We deﬁne this region to
include all counties along the Red River on the eastern border of North Dakota as well as
the next layer of counties in. The twelve counties in this region are illustrated in Figure
2.8 (They are also listed as part of Table 2 below.) There are a total of 231,000 ﬁelds in the
region.9 Equivalently, there are 14400 ≈ 23100016 square miles, since there are 16 ﬁelds
in each square mile section.
4.2 Crops
Our crop data are from the Crop Data Layer (CDL) program of the National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS). The data are based on satellite images combined with survey
information on the ground. Using the survey data, the NASS estimates a model of how
satellite images correspond to crops. The map product contains the ﬁtted values.
Compared to other states, North Dakota is special in that there exists a relatively long
panel of annual CDL data that begins in 1997. There is signiﬁcant variation across states
in the availability of CDL data, since its collection depends upon the cooperation of state
agencies. For example, there currently is no analogous CDL data available for Minnesota,
which lies on the eastern side of the Red River Valley. The availability of many years of
data with which we can determine long-run average land use is an important reason why we
7The boundary ﬁles for sections are posted by the North Dakota State University Extension Geospa-
tial Education Project at http://134.129.78.3/geospatial/default.htm. We constructed the boundaries for
quarters and quarter quarters ourselves by subdividing the section boundaries.
8We excluded Barnes County, which is the second layer in from Cass County, because of concerns we had
about the data quality of our soil information for this county.
9We discard quarter quarters (QQs) that do not consist of a regular quarter mile by quarter mile square.
These nonregular QQs are negligible in land area. In footnote 10 we explain our precise criteria.
16picked North Dakota over other states.
The resolution of the crop data is at the level of 30 meter by 30 meter squares (approx-
imately four points per acre). We use the program ArcGIS to strip the crop information
f r o mt h em a pp r o d u c to ﬀered by NASS. We take a ﬁxed grid of points 30 meters apart and
for each year locate the point in the CDL map to determine the crop associated with this
point in each year. There are 40.8 million points in the grid for our twelve-county region.
Table 1 lists the land use classiﬁc a t i o n sa n dt h ef r a c t i o no fg r i dp o i n t si ne a c hc a t e g o r y
averaged over our 1997—2006 sample period.10 The most common category is “Spring
wheat,” which has a .223 share. “Soybeans” is next, and then “Pasture” and “Fallow/idle
cropland.” Urban activity is negligible in this area, as can be seen from the .017 share for
“Urban.” The category “Clouds,” with a .028 percent share, is for observations where the
satellite view of the point in a given year is blocked by clouds.
N e x tw em a pe a c hg r i dp o i n tf r o mt h ec r o pd a t ai n t ot h eﬁeld that contains it. Figure 3
illustrates some ﬁelds in Pembina County and the grid points they contain. The dark lines
are the quarter section boundaries. The lighter lines are ﬁeld boundaries within a quarter
section. As can be seen in Figure 3, we trim oﬀ the points near the border of each ﬁeld and
use only interior points. We want to be careful not to misclassify a point near a border as
being in an adjacent ﬁeld. Each ﬁeld side is .25 miles (400 meters). We trim the points
that are .03 miles (48 meters) on each side of the border. Each ﬁeld has approximately 100
points in the interior.11
Suppose crops are indexed by  a n dg r i dp o i n t si n d e x e db y.L e t 
 =1if crop  is
p l a n t e da tg r i dp o i n t in year  and set it to zero otherwise. Let ¯ 
 be the mean value of

 over the years in the sample. For example, if wheat is planted at grid point  in ﬁve of
the ten years, then ¯ 
 = 1
2. Farmers in the region commonly practice crop rotation, and
one such rotation is to alternate between wheat and soybeans. If this rotation is practiced
at point ,t h e n¯ 
 = 1
2.
To aggregate the grid point crop information to the level of a ﬁeld, we deﬁne ¯ 
 to
be the mean of ¯ 
 over all the grid points  in the interior of ﬁeld  on quarter section .
This long-run average for each ﬁeld corresponds to variable ¯  in our econometric model.12
10The table uses the category deﬁnitions from the 2005 CDL. In 2006, the Conservation Reserve Program
was shifted from the “Pasture” category to the “Fallow/idle cropland” category, resulting in a large shift
between these categories. Over the years, there have also been a few reclassiﬁcations for some small crops
like canola. These reclassiﬁcations do not matter for any of the major crops.
11We drop ﬁelds that have more than 130 points or less than 66 points. The soil information is missing
for some points, and we also drop ﬁelds if more than 10 percent of their points have missing information.
These cases represent a negligible land area.
12The selected data and programs used in the paper are posted at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/lee/
research.html.
17Table 2 presents the summary statistics for ¯ 
 by county and overall for the two major
crops, spring wheat and soybeans. We can see in this table that there is variation in crop
choice across counties. For example, the soybean share is relatively low in the northern
counties (.04 in Cavalier, .09 in Pembina) and high in the southern counties (.23 in Sargent,
.27 in Richland). There is also substantial variation across ﬁelds within each county.
4.3 Soil
Our soil data are taken from the Soil Survey Geographic (SSURGO) database maintained by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Any given county can have hundreds of diﬀerent soil
types. The SSURGO data map the location of the various soils at a high level of resolution
and provide underlying soil and ground characteristics for each soil type. The soil taxonomy
is a standard soil classiﬁcation system based on soil-forming processes, wetness, climatic
environment, major parent material, soil temperature, soil moisture regimes, and so on. It
has diﬀerent classiﬁcation levels: order—suborder—great group—subgroup—family—series, and
the SSURGO data set has the ﬁrst four. With the four levels, there are 1,200 types of soils
in the system, and the areas we consider have 67 of them. The data come in the form of a
map boundary ﬁle. We take each point in our above-mentioned 30 meter by 30 meter grid
and use the SSURGO data to determine the soil and ground characteristics of that point.
As with the crop variables, we average the soil variables across points in a ﬁeld to obtain
, the value of soil characteristic  on ﬁeld  of quarter section .L e t  be the vector
of the  characteristics. In our analysis, this vector will include 67 dummy variables
for diﬀerent soil taxonomy codes, plus slope, aspect, air temperature, annual precipitation,
elevation, annual unfreezing days, soil loss tolerance factor ( factor), wind erosion index
(wei), latitude, longitude and their quadratic terms, and 12 dummy variables for counties.
Altogether, there are  =1 1 0characteristics.
The SSURGO soil map data are considered reliable enough to have widespread use in
practical applications. The maps can be found in real estate listings for farm property
analogous to the way in which listings of houses for sale include pictures of each room. The
detailed soil information is used in North Dakota to determine land value assessments for
property taxes.
We demonstrate the utility of the soil data for our purposes by running some preliminary
regressions. We regress the planting choice  at the ﬁeld level on the ﬁeld’s own soil char-
acteristics, ignoring the characteristics of the ﬁeld’s neighbors. We run the regression for
each of the twelve counties for each crop separately, so all of the variation in ﬁeld character-
istics is coming from within-county variation in soil variables. To interpret this regression
18in terms of our model, note that if there are no density economies,  =  =0 ,t h e nt h e
policy function coeﬃcients on neighboring qualities  and  equal zero and it is possible
to consistently identify (up to a multiplicative scalar) the ﬁeld attribute coeﬃcients  in
(15) through an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Table 3 reports, for each crop,
the mean value of the 2 of this regression averaged over the 12 counties. It also reports
the minimum, median and maximum. Recall that the crops are sorted so that the most
important crops come ﬁrst. The 2 tends to be fairly high for the more important crops.
The mean 2 across the twelve counties is .34 for spring wheat and .24 for soybeans. The
2 is less for the smaller crops, but it is still non-negligible. Some of these smaller crops,
such as sugar beets or potatoes, tend to be concentrated in particular counties, so the 2 is
naturally higher in the places where the crops are grown.
One ﬁnal point about soil is that human behavior can impact soil properties–what soil
scientists call the anthropogenic impact. In the Red River Valley, the largest anthropogenic
impact was due to cooperative eﬀorts to drain most of the land beginning in the early 1900s.
This eﬀort resulted in a legal drain system regulated by county governments. Since these
eﬀorts were regional in nature, they rarely led to diﬀerences in soil conditions at property
line boundaries. A producer’s management decisions can impact nutrients and stored soil
moisture conditions for next year’s crop, but these seasonal use-dependent variables are not
measured as part of routine soil surveys. Farming practices employed over a long period of
time can impact erosion and result in changes in near-surface soil properties. However, in
the Red River Valley region, farmers have tended to use similar, proven practices on this
valuable land. Most of the soils in the Red River Valley did not suﬀe rt h eD u s tB o w le r o s i o n
problems in the 1930s, as areas farther west and south did. According to Mike Ulmer, the
USDA-NRCS senior regional soil scientist for the Northern Great Plains, most signiﬁcant
variations in soil variables for the Red River Valley region are due to natural soil genesis
rather than human behavior.13
5 Basic Analysis
This section conducts the basic empirical analysis. The ﬁrst part estimates the structural
model parameters. The second part uses the model estimates to examine the contributions
of density economies and comparative advantage to specialization.
13We are grateful to Mike Ulmer for his help with this paragraph. The USDA-NRCS is the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service.
195.1 Parameter Estimates
The structure parameters of our model consist of density economy parameters  and 
and the ﬁeld quality coeﬃcients .( T h e ﬁeld quality coeﬃcients  and 
0 are scaled so
that (9) holds, and 
0 drops out.) We use the nonlinear least squares procedure discussed in
Section 3 to estimate the structural parameters of equation (15) for each crop.
Our baseline estimates are obtained by estimating the model on a crop-by-crop basis
jointly for all twelve counties together.14 The density parameters ,  are assumed to be
the same in each county and the soil characteristics vector  is the same, except that we
allow for county dummies in the soil vector. These estimates are reported in Table 4. The
policy function estimates as well as the structural parameter estimates are reported. (The
coeﬃcients on soil quality are too numerous to report here but are available upon request.)
We begin our discussion with the policy parameter estimates. The robust pattern across
all the crops is that the planting rule for a given ﬁeld depends heavily on the neighboring
ﬁelds. Furthermore, as one would expect, the eﬀect is stronger with the type A neighbors
that are immediately adjacent as compared to the type B diagonal neighbor. Given the
scaling (9), the policy parameters sum to one (0 +2  +  =1 ). If there were no
density economies, then the own quality coeﬃcient  would equal one. It is apparent in
the table that  is substantially less than one for all of the crops. Consider spring wheat,
for example. The weight on own ﬁeld quality is .66. The weight  on the two adjacent
ﬁelds is .13 each, and the weight  on the diagonal is .09. Altogether, fully one-third of
the weight in the planting decision of spring wheat for a particular ﬁeld depends upon the
qualities of the other ﬁelds in the quarter section.
We turn now to the structural parameters. The robust pattern across all the crops is that
the density economy parameter  for adjacent ﬁelds is signiﬁcantly positive. The parameter
 is substantially smaller in each case. The last column contains Θ, the composite density
parameter (equal to 2 +). Recall the interpretation for Θ discussed above. If density
economies are shut down for a particular crop at a particular quarter section, this is the
decline in planting of the crop, expressed as a share of the initial planting. For wheat,
t h ed e c l i n es h a r ew o u l db e. 3 8 9 . F o rm o s to ft h eo t h e rc r o p s ,t h ed e c l i n ei se v e nb i g g e r .
The estimated density economies are suﬃciently big that if the farmer were precluded from
enjoying them for a particular crop, we predict there would be a substantial reduction in the
planting of the crop.
Next we discuss the robustness of our estimates under alternative speciﬁcations and data
restrictions. We focus on the robustness of our estimate of the composite Θ b e c a u s et h i si sa
14We use only those quarter sections with four complete ﬁelds.
20useful summary statistic. The baseline speciﬁcation imposes that the structural parameters
are constant across all counties including the soil coeﬃcients. Our ﬁrst robustness check is
to estimate the model separately for each of the twelve counties. In Table 5 we report our
average estimate of Θ. There is little diﬀerence in the result. The average Θsa r eh i g h e r
than the baseline model estimates for seven crops and lower for the other ﬁve crops.
Next we consider what happens when we throw out quarter sections that contain land that
is other than prime farmland. Our soil data contain a ranking of soil quality with categories
like “prime farmland,” “farmland of local importance,” and “not prime farmland.” For our
baseline, we leave in all of the categories because the issues we are interested in very much
apply here. A farmer might be more willing to plant wheat on a ﬁeld that is not prime
farmland if it is next to a ﬁeld that is. Still, it is interesting to see what happens when we
condition on all of the land being prime farmland so that all variation in soils is then within
the prime farmland category. When we restrict attention to quarter sections where all four
ﬁelds are 100 percent prime farmland, we eliminate 46 percent of the observations. Table
5 shows the results. The composite density parameter Θ actually tends to increase when
the model is estimated on the prime farmland subsample, going from .389 to .578 for wheat,
.422 to .598 for soybeans, and .672 to .825 for corn.
5.2 What Determines Specialization?
In the theory section, we deﬁned the within specialization measure and decomposed it into
natural advantage share and density economy share. We do not directly observe actual soil
qualities. But with our parameter estimates, we can compute ﬁtted values. We take the
ﬁtted values of soil quality and the ﬁtted values of crop choice and plug these into our formulas
for the specialization measure and shares. We evaluate means at the level of a county. For
example, we calculate _ for a particular crop by diﬀerencing out the mean in
each county. Then we average over the county-level variances. So the specialization we
examine compares quarter sections within the same county. Table 6 reports the results.
Recall that the within specialization measure captures specialization beyond what would
happen with a dartboard. The measure would be zero if there were no density economies
a n ds o i lq u a l i t yw e r ed i s t r i b u t e di . i . d .w i t h i ne a c hc o u n t y .T h em e a s u r eb e c o m e so n ei fa l l
the four ﬁelds of each quarter section were planted exactly the same way. Table 6 shows
that the measure is roughly .9 throughout various crops, which indicates a strong tendency
for specialization within quarter sections. We decompose this specialization measure into
the natural advantage share and the density economy share. Table 6 shows that roughly
two thirds of the specialization is due to natural advantage and one third is due to density
21economies.
6F u r t h e r A n a l y s i s
The key empirical ﬁnding of the previous section is that planting in a land parcel depends
on neighboring soil characteristics in addition to those of the parcel itself. From this exhib-
ited behavior, we recover structural parameters in which density economies are signiﬁcant.
A natural concern in interpreting any result like this is that there are some unobservable
characteristics of the given land parcel that are somehow being captured by the measured
soil characteristics of the neighbors. The most plausible candidate here is some kind of mea-
surement error in soil classiﬁcation. Perhaps a soil scientist made a mistake in classifying
one ﬁeld but got things correct on an adjacent ﬁeld. For example, suppose type  soil is
good for corn and type  is good for wheat. Actual soil types of nearby ﬁelds tend to be
correlated, and it may be that all of the ﬁelds of a quarter section are type .I f o n e ﬁeld
is mistakenly classiﬁed as –and we see wheat planted on this ﬁeld–we might mistakenly
attribute this to density economies ﬂowing from the adjacent wheat ﬁelds.
Here we explore the issue by examining what happens across the borders of quarter
sections, taking an approach in the spirit of Holmes (1998). The idea is that if all of our
results are entirely due to soil measurement error issues and the like, then we should get
similar results when we look at ﬁelds that cross quarter section boundaries and ownership
boundaries. But if our results are arising from density economies, then we would expect
the results to be attenuated at such boundaries, because such boundaries are relatively
more likely to be boundaries between farm operations. We expect the potential for density
economies to be less when adjacent ﬁelds are managed by diﬀerent operations.
The ﬁrst part of this section introduces additional data on farm operations. The second
part presents simple descriptive evidence to make our point. In the last part, we reestimate
our model with some of the additional data brought in.
6.1 Ownership Data
Here we introduce additional data related to ownership. The data make the point that quar-
ter section boundaries are closely connected to ownership and administration boundaries.
Recall we earlier deﬁned the  neighbors of a ﬁeld to be the two directly adjacent neigh-
boring ﬁelds in the same quarter section. As illustrated in Figure 4a, a ﬁeld has two
additional adjacent neighbors in diﬀerent quarter sections. Call these the  neighbors of a
22ﬁeld.
For one of the counties of our study, Cass County, we have obtained a ﬁle containing
all the land parcels in the county and the name of the owner of each parcel.15 We take
each point in our above-mentioned 30 meter by 30 meter grid and map it to our parcel
information. We then aggregate up to the ﬁeld level.16
I nT a b l e7 ,w ee x a m i n ed i ﬀerences in ownership at ﬁeld boundaries. For this analysis, we
exclude ﬁelds categorized as urban from the soil ﬁle information (approximately 2 percent
of the observations) and ﬁelds where one of the owner names is blank at the ﬁeld boundaries
(slightly more than 1 percent of observations). We classify boundaries of adjacent ﬁelds
as to whether the ﬁelds are  neighbors or  neighbors. We see from Table 7 that for
 neighbors, in a fraction .87 of the time, the two ﬁelds are part of the same legal land
parcel. In contrast, if the ﬁelds are  neighbors–again, meaning that they are separated
by a quarter section boundary–in only .01 of the time are the ﬁelds part of the same legal
parcel. Table 7 makes clear that in this county, legally deﬁned land ownership parcels are
essentially quarter sections.
Even when adjacent ﬁelds are contained in diﬀerent legal parcels, it still may be the case
that the two parcels are held by the same owner. The table also shows the fraction of cases
where owner name is identical for the adjacent ﬁelds.17 At  borders, the match rate goes
from .87 for parcels to .92 for owner name. At  borders, the match rate goes from .01 to
.29. So we see that ownership commonly crosses quarter section boundaries. Nevertheless,
in well more than half of the cases, adjacent ﬁelds that cross quarter section boundaries are
held by owners with diﬀerent names.
Even when ownership names diﬀer across quarter section boundaries, the ﬁelds may be
operated as part of the same operation. Fields held within the same family can be listed
under diﬀerent names (e.g., a wife’s or grandmother’s maiden name). And farmers can
operate land that they lease. The Department of Agriculture maintains a database of
farm operation boundaries but does not publicly release this information. However, before
2008, it released a data product that we can use to draw inferences about farm operation
boundaries. (The 2008 Farm Act bans release of the data from this point forward, so we are
lucky to get the data when we did.) The data are geospatial information on “Common Land
Units” (CLUs). These are the reporting units for government subsidy programs. CLUs are
15This GIS shapeﬁle is posted by the Cass County government at http://www.casscountynd.gov/
departments/gis/Download.htm/. We used the ﬁle that was current as of 2007/07/30.
16In the rare cases where there are diﬀerent owner names within the same ﬁeld, we assign ownership to
the modal name.
17Identical owner name is deﬁn e da sam a t c ho nt h eﬁrst ﬁve characters. Last name is listed ﬁrst, so this
permits matches on diﬀerent ﬁr s tn a m e s . I td o e sn o tm a k em u c hd i ﬀerence if we require a match on all the
characters.
23typically quarter sections, though there is much variation. The public release of the CLU
data did not disclose the individual operators. Nevertheless, it was published in such a way
that we were able to manipulate it to determine which county oﬃce administers the federal
farm programs for each ﬁeld.18 Typically, a ﬁeld is administered by the oﬃce in the same
county as the ﬁeld. But there are cases where farm operations cross county boundaries, and
in such cases it is typically convenient for the farmer to work with a single administrative
oﬃce. In such a case, a ﬁeld can be administered by an oﬃce in a diﬀerent county from
where the ﬁeld is located.
The bottom part of Table 7 shows our results for the county administrator variable in
Cass County. Adjacent ﬁelds being administered by diﬀerent counties is relatively rare. Out
of about 54,000 adjacent ﬁeld pairs, this happens only 1,002 times. When this does happen,
it is 10 times as likely to occur when the pair crosses quarter section boundaries (type )
than not (type )–1,002 instances versus 110. For these type  borders, the fraction of
cases with the same ownership name falls from .30 if the administrator is the same to only
.06 if the administrator is diﬀerent. We take this as solid evidence that a diﬀerence in county
administrator across ﬁeld boundaries is a good signal of a diﬀerence in farm operations across
ﬁeld boundaries. This is useful because we have the county administrator variable for all our
counties but have the legal parcel information just for Cass County. Below, we use both
variables.
6.2 Evidence of Planting Discontinuities at Quarter Section
Boundaries
This part makes the point that soil quality does not change discontinuously at quarter section
boundaries, but planting does. We begin with a graphical illustration. Figure 5a provides
a map of soil boundaries for a particular area in our sample and an overlay of the quarter
section boundaries. It illustrates there is heterogeneity in soils within a ﬁeld. Given the
arbitrary way in which quarter section boundaries were drawn back in the early 1800s, we
expect to see no connection with soil boundaries and no connection is evident here.
Figure 5b provides a crop map over the same area. The connection between crop borders
and quarter section borders is readily evident. So we see that crops change at quarter
section boundaries but soil does not.
We now make the same point in a table. In column 1 of Table 8, we report the mean
within quarter section deviation of soil quality for each crop, normalized by the mean plant-
18The county-level CLU data happen to contain (1) all the CLUs in the county plus (2) CLUs outside the
county that are administered by the county.
24ings for the crop.19 The statistic reported is like a coeﬃc i e n to fv a r i a t i o n . N o t et h a tt h e
variation of soil quality within quarter sections is signiﬁcant, the statistic ranging from about
.12 to .24 throughout the various crops. The existence of this within quarter section soil
heterogeneity is a key part of our identiﬁcation strategy.
To explain the second column, we introduce the concept of a fake quarter section.A s
illustrated in Figure 4b, we imagine the quarter section boundaries were drawn one-quarter
mile to the west and one-quarter mile to the north, compared to the way they were actually
drawn. As before, there are four ﬁelds in a fake quarter section. But now we see that each
ﬁeld is actually in a diﬀerent true quarter section. Now ﬁeld boundaries are actually quarter
section boundaries.
In column 2, we do the same calculation as for column 1, except we calculate the standard
deviation of soils within each fake quarter section. The two columns are virtually the same.
Just as in Figure 5a, soil changes are unrelated to quarter section boundaries.
The last two columns report the standard deviation within each quarter section in actual
average plantings, again normalized by the mean levels. The variation is much greater
across boundaries in the fake quarters than within boundaries for the actual quarters. This
is consistent with the sharp delineation in crop boundaries illustrated in Figure 5b.
6.3 Extended Model Estimates
We reestimate our earlier model in three diﬀerent ways and show how taking into account
boundary considerations impacts the results. The results are in Table 9. For the sake of
comparison with our earlier work, we repeat in the ﬁrst column of Table 9 our baseline
estimate of the Θ from Table 4.20
The ﬁr s te x e r c i s er e e s t i m a t e st h em o d e le x a c t l ya sw ed i di nT a b l e4 ,e x c e p tw eu s et h e
fake quarters rather than the actual quarters. Recall that the distribution of soils for the
f a k eq u a r t e r si st h es a m ea sf o rt h ea c t u a lq u a r t e r s . W eg e tv e r yd i ﬀerent results with
the fake quarters. The estimate of Θ is attenuated for all of the crops. For example, for
wheat, the coeﬃcient falls from .39 to .32, soybeans .42 to .37, corn .67 to .56. Now we are
not surprised that we are still getting estimates of signiﬁcant density economies even in the
fake quarters, because we expect density economies are larger and extend beyond quarter
sections, an issue we raise in the conclusion. Our main point is that a measurement error
19For each quarter section  we compute the standard deviation across the four ﬁe l d sa n dt h e nt a k et h e
mean over all quarter sections over all 12 counties. We divide by mean plantings for each crop, which
approximately equals the means in Table 1. (The slight diﬀerence arises because a few incomplete quarter
sections are thrown out here.)
20We get a slightly diﬀerent number of observations because we use only the ﬁelds that have all three
neighbors in the same fake squares.
25story for why we are getting positive estimates for Θ cannot account for why these estimates
would be attenuated at quarter section boundaries.
The second exercise estimates the model with actual quarters, as in our original approach.
But now we use information about county administration. We estimate a speciﬁcation of
the reduced form policy function so that plantings in neighboring given ﬁelds are weighted
by  and  as before if they are administered by the same county. But if a diﬀerent county
(and then likely a diﬀerent operation), we assume the weights are  and .S o t h e
parameter  is like a discount factor. In the estimates, there is clear pattern of substantial
discounting. We focus our discussion on the major crops. For spring wheat, soybeans, and
corn, the discount factors are .59, .70, .51. These are substantially below one.
The third exercise is analogous to the second exercise. But now we discount when the
name is diﬀerent rather than when the county administrator is diﬀerent. We use data from
Cass County because that is all that is available. For all but the negligible crops at the
bottom of the list where there is little data, there is a clear pattern of discounting. For
example, for spring wheat, soybeans, and corn the estimated discount factors are .78, .67,
and .81. Again, these are well less than one, but not zero. We do not expect these to come
out to zero, because farm operation boundaries clearly can cross ownership name boundaries
through rental markets and through diﬀerent names in the same family. Again, the point
here is that alternative explanations for our positive estimates of  and  based on some
kind of measurement error that is averaged out across ﬁeld boundaries cannot account for
why the estimates are signiﬁcantly attenuated at name change boundaries. Our density
economy explanation can account for this pattern.
One last thing to note is that planting patterns can change at ownership boundaries
because diﬀerent farmers may have diﬀerent skills for diﬀerent crops. We do not regard
this point as an alternative explanation of the phenomenon we have identiﬁed but rather
an instance of what we are emphasizing. If a crop is to be planted on a particular ﬁeld,
it is good to have a farmer to work the ﬁeld whose skill set is a good match for the crop.
But given the indivisibilities involved with farm labor, it will be desirable to have that same
farmer work adjacent ﬁelds.
7C o n c l u s i o n
For the quarter sections in North Dakota’s Red River Valley, we estimate the determinants
of crop specialization. We quantify the relative contributions of Ellison-Glaeser dartboard
eﬀects, natural advantage (land characteristics), and scale economies (density economies
26here). These kinds of decompositions are diﬃcult to provide in most settings. We are able
to get somewhere in this setting because (1) the natural advantage factor in agriculture is
overwhelming, (2) we are able to get extremely detailed data at a narrow geographic level
on land characteristics and choice, and (3) in the early 1800s, the United States government
drew an arbitrary square grid of quarter sections in the landscape, and we make heavy use
of this grid.
We believe the major limitation of this paper is that it does not take into account density
economies that extend beyond the quarter section level. The average farm size in North
Dakota from recent Census ﬁgures is eight quarter sections.21 Of course, planting decisions
at the individual farm operation level will extend more broadly over a farm’s operations
and not just a single quarter section. Moreover, we expect that scale economies extend
beyond individual farm operations because the ﬁxed costs of infrastructure such as grain
elevators, sugar beet processing plants, and research in location-speciﬁcs e e d sa r es p r e a d
over many farms, and as neighboring farmers share knowledge. Once we start expanding
the geographic scope to be big enough to cross individual farm operations, we need to bring
in various game-theoretic coordination issues and externality issues. As a ﬁrst step, we
picked a land unit–a quarter section–small enough that we could be conﬁdent it was all
under the same management, but large enough so that it is possible to conduct an interesting
geographic analysis. The next step in this research line is to broaden the geographic reach
and confront externality issues.
We expect that our approach of combining micro soil data with the satellite crop data will
have other applications. Indeed, having such detailed information about what is happening
at such a narrow geographic level is rare in any industry. In particular, these data could
be used to look at the impacts of government policies, perhaps including policies related
to ethanol. The corn-soybean rotation mentioned in the introduction has actually been
discontinued recently by some farmers wishing to take advantage of ethanol-induced high
prices for corn and planting corn every year instead. The detailed data permit us to
determine exactly where the switches are taking place.
21In the 2002 Census, the average farm size in North Dakota is reported to be 1,238 acres or 8.01=1,238/160
quarter sections. If we were to weight farms by acreage, the mean would be substantially higher.
27A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Setting  =  and  =0in the equations for , ,a n d i nt h et e x ta n di m p o s i n gt h e














So we can write 1 − ¯  as (noting ¯  =¯ )














































































1 − ¯  − 2









for 1 and ∆ deﬁned by
1 ≡ 1 − ¯  − 2




∆ ≡ 2 + 3 − 1 − 4.
28From symmetry we have
2 ≡ 2 − ¯  − 2




3 ≡ 3 − ¯  − 2




4 ≡ 4 − ¯  − 2
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2 − ¯  − 2















3 − ¯  − 2
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Observe that the ¯  term will cancel out when we add these up, so set it to zero. If we add
the ﬁrst and fourth lines, we get





1 − 4 − 4
2 (1 − 4)
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[−4(1 − 4)]









By symmetry, when we add the second and third lines, we get









29Adding these together yields
























This is negative as long as 1 − 20 and 1 − 4
2  0, which is true for 1
2,a sc l a i m e d .
Q.E.D.
A.2 Calculation of the Dartboard Dispersion Measure
I nt h ec a s ew h e r eﬁeld quality is i.i.d., the population mean for large  of the within-quarter
section variance is









































where we use independence of the draws of 1, 2, 3, 4, for the equalities in lines 3 and 4.
A.3 How to Calculate Standard Errors of the Nonlinear Least
Square Estimates Obtained with the Two-Stage Method
This section shows an easy way to calculate the standard errors (and covariance matrix) of
the estimates (γβ) using any statistical package. (See Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for
a more detailed explanation.) We express the estimation equation (15) as the following:





4 and  = 1 +  (2 + 3)+4
30Let
³
ˆ γ ˆ β
´
be the nonlinear least squares estimates and let X(γβ)=[ x(γβ)γ















































This is called the Gauss-Newton regression (GNR) and the covariance matrix for the































Since the regressor does not have any explanatory power (b = 0), (0)
2 is equal to 2 in
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Figure 2. Counties Used in Our Analysis 
(North Dakota Red River Region)






















Cavalier  Bottineau 
Traill 
Emmons 


















































Mississippi Figure 3. Example Fields and Grid Points 
from Pembina County 
 










Figure 4a. Extended Neighborhoods 

















Figure 4b. Fake Quarter Neighborhoods 
1 2 1  2 
3 4 3  4 
D  C  D 
1 2 1  2 
C  A 
3 4 3  4 
D  A  B 
Note: Dotted lines indicate fake quarter section boundaries. Note that in a fake 
quarter section, each field belongs to a different true quarter section. Figure 5a. Example Soil Map in a Quarter Section





Land Use in North Dakota Red River Region 




Spring Wheat  .223 
Soybeans .158 
Pasture/Range/Conservation Reserve Program/Farmstead  .154 
Fallow/Idle Cropland  .098 
Corn .049 





Durum Wheat  .026 
Other Small Grains & Hay (Oats, Millet, Rye & Winter 




Other Crops (Canola, Flaxseed, Safflower and Very Small 
Acreage Crops)  .012 
Woods, Woodland Pasture  .010 
Potatoes .009 
Miscellaneous (15 Residual Categories)  .018 
 
          Source: Authors calculations with Cropland Data Layer North Dakota 1997 - 2006Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Crop Planting Share at the Field Level 
Two Major Crops in North Dakota Red River Region 
 
 
   Spring  Wheat  Soybean 
County  Number 
of Fields  Mean Std  Dev  Min  Max  Mean Std  Dev  Min  Max 
All  Counties  231,595  .23 .16 .00 .86 .17 .15 .00 .98 
 
By County            
Cass  28,750  .25 .14 .00 .70 .34 .15 .00 .98 
Cavalier  24,576  .30 .15 .00 .79 .04 .04 .00 .33 
Grand  Forks  23,426  .25 .15 .00 .72 .16 .11 .00 .65 
Nelson  16,128  .20 .16 .00 .70 .08 .09 .00 .57 
Pembina  18,599  .31 .16 .00 .86 .09 .08 .00 .54 
Ramsey  21,102  .18 .13 .00 .65 .06 .07 .00 .41 
Ransom  13,824  .14 .15 .00 .75 .17 .15 .00 .68 
Richland  24,013  .15 .14 .00 .67 .27 .15 .00 .84 
Sargent  14,324  .14 .13 .00 .62 .23 .16 .00 .72 
Steele  11,520  .27 .13 .00 .72 .23 .13 .00 .78 
Traill  14,327  .25 .13 .00 .69 .27 .13 .00 .75 
Walsh  21,006  .27 .16 .00 .74 .09 .08 .00 .54 
 






Goodness of Fit of Planting Regression on Soil Characteristics 
(Summary Statistics of R
2s of Individual Regressions for Each of Twelve Counties) 
 
 
Crop Mean  Min  Median  Max 
Spring  Wheat  .335 .210 .322 .562 
Soybeans  .237 .084 .246 .384 
Corn  .182 .057 .196 .393 
Dry  Beans  .156 .057 .154 .337 
Sunflowers  .108 .047 .108 .222 
Barley  .115 .032 .110 .239 
Durum  Wheat  .102 .027 .054 .257 
Other  Small  Grains  .179 .055 .168 .333 
Canola  .078 .021 .044 .250 
Beets  .152 .028 .129 .360 
Other  Selected  Crops  .067 .020 .048 .165 
Potatoes  .119 .041 .088 .318 
 
 
*Note: For each regression, the planting choice of a field is regressed on its own field 
characteristics, ignoring the characteristics of the neighboring fields. 
Table 4 
Baseline model estimates 
(N =  208,220) 
 
    
Policy 
Parameters     
Structural 
Parameters   
 Crop  γO  γA  γB  θA  θB  Θ =2θA + θB
Spring  Wheat  .658 .128 .087 .160 .070  .389 
  
(.006) (.004) (.006) (.008) (.012)  (.008) 
Soybeans  .632 .137 .094 .174 .074  .422 
  
(.007) (.005) (.007) (.011) (.017)  (.010) 
Corn  .459 .199 .144 .316 .040  .672 
  
(.007) (.005) (.007) (.027) (.044)  (.014) 
Dry  Beans  .530 .181 .109 .278 .016  .573 
  
(.010) (.006) (.009) (.026) (.039)  (.017) 
Sunflowers  .613 .147 .093 .197 .056  .451 
  
(.012) (.008) (.011) (.020) (.030)  (.017) 
Barley  .757 .095 .053 .113 .041  .267 
  
(.011) (.007) (.010) (.011) (.017)  (.014) 
Durum  Wheat  .721 .115 .048 .147 .019  .313 
  
(.011) (.007) (.010) (.014) (.020)  (.015) 
Other  Small  Grains  .519 .183 .114 .284 .020  .588 
  
(.008) (.005) (.008) (.023) (.035)  (.015) 
Canola  .602 .143 .112 .180 .100  .460 
  
(.013) (.009) (.013) (.021) (.033)  (.019) 
Beets  .366 .225 .184 .408 .002  .818 
  
(.012) (.008) (.012) (.088) (.152)  (.028) 
Other  Selected  Crops  .706 .112 .070 .136 .056  .329 
  
(.015) (.009) (.014) (.018) (.027)  (.020) 
Potatoes  .325 .234 .207 .441  0  .882 
  
(.010) (.002) (.005) (.008)  (0)  (.0015) 
 Table 5 
Robustness Check 
 
  Baseline Model  By County  Only on Prime 
Farm Land 
Crop  Θ Average  Θ  Θ 
Spring Wheat  .389  .447  .578 
  (.008) (.117)* (.022) 
Soybeans .422  .433  .598 
  (.010) (.147)* (.026) 
Corn .672  .527  .825 
  (.014) (.248)* (.028) 
Dry Beans  .573  .567  .503 
  (.017) (.237)* (.032) 
Sunflowers .451  .551  .702 
  (.017) (.121)* (.045) 
Barley .267  .536  .624 
  (.014) (.244)* (.062) 
Durum Wheat  .313  .543  .818 
  (.015) (.250)* (.057) 
Other Small Grains  .588  .574  .470 
  (.015) (.229)* (.032) 
Canola .460  .664  .870 
  (.019) (.243)* (.035) 
Beets .818  .759  .739 
  (.028) (.178)* (.026) 
Other Selected Crops  .329  .588  .804 
  (.020) (.266)* (.066) 
Potatoes .882  .730  .867 
  (.0015) (.148)*  (.024) 
N  208,220   111,596 
 










Spring Wheat  .880  .690  .310 
Soybeans .891  .670  .330 
Corn .970  .674  .326 
Dry Beans  .943  .669  .331 
Sunflowers .869  .544  .456 
Barley .762  .646  .354 
Durum Wheat  .855  .761  .239 
Other Small Grains  .942  .634  .366 
Canola .945  .802  .198 
Beets .995  .862  .138 
Other Selected Crops  .895  .808  .192 
Potatoes .996  .689  .311  
 
Table 7 
Ownership Statistics for Cass County 

















        
A     .87  .92  27,271 
C     .01  .29  26,946 
        
A   Yes  .87  .93  27,161 
A   No  .34  .41  110 
        
 
C   Yes  .01  .30  25,944 
C   No  .00  .06  1,002 
 
Source: Cass county property parcel map, county level common land unit maps  
 
Table 8 
Variation in Soil and Crop Plantings 




   x variation  y variation 
 Crop  Actual Fake Actual Fake 
Spring Wheat  .136 .137 .230 .379 
Soybeans  .120 .121 .257 .417 
Corn  .249 .253 .391 .713 
Dry Beans  .185 .188 .477 .724 
Sunflowers  .125 .127 .481 .765 
Barley  .132 .133 .471 .698 
Durum Wheat  .132 .134 .506 .677 
Other Small Grains  .244 .248 .621 .837 
Canola  .166 .166 .469 .763 
Beets  .249 .251 .450 .840 
Other Selected Crops  .168 .169 .537 .857 
Potatoes  .284 .287 .616 .866 
   











Policy Function Estimates 
With Discounting if Different 
County Administrator 
Policy Function Estimates 
With Discounting if Different 
Ownership Name 
(Cass County Only) 
Crop  Θ  Θ  γA  γB  δ  γA  γB  δ 
Spring  Wheat  .389  .318  .129 .085 .592 .192 .089 .836 
   (.008)  (.008)  (.004) (.006) (.041) (.016) (.024) (.028) 
Soybeans  .422  .368  .137 .094 .703 .157 .053 .773 
   (.010)  (.011)  (.005) (.007) (.048) (.014) (.021) (.034) 
Corn  .672  .558  .199 .144 .509 .197 .147 .606 
   (.014)  (.014)  (.005) (.007) (.066) (.016) (.023) (.065) 
Dry  Beans  .573  .472  .182 .108 .711 .246 .160 .933 
   (.017)  (.016)  (.006) (.009) (.052) (.026) (.038) (.056) 
Sunflowers  .451  .311  .148 .093 .761 .234 .132 .782 
   (.017)  (.018)  (.008) (.011) (.074) (.023) (.035) (.067) 
Barley  .267  .188  .097 .050 .354 .241 .266 .824 
   (.014)  (.014)  (.007) (.010) (.101) (.034) (.052) (.045) 
Durum  Wheat  .313  .244  .118 .045 .000 .184 .255 .919 
   (.015)  (.015)  (.007) (.010) (.091) (.034) (.050) (.056) 
Other  Small  Grains  .588  .449  .183 .114  1.326  .145 .013  1.642 
   (.015)  (.013)  (.005) (.008) (.064) (.013) (.019) (.184) 
Canola  .460  .375  .155 .152 .000 .241 .152 .992 
   (.019)  (.019)  (.008) (.012) (.061) (.039) (.058) (.081) 
Beets  .818  .759  .228 .181 .781 .229 .182 .874 
   (.028)  (.026)  (.008) (.012) (.043) (.024) (.035) (.060) 
Other  Selected  Crops .329  .283  .122 .088 .000 .261 .171  1.014 
   (.020)  (.020)  (.009) (.013) (.101) (.038) (.058) (.157) 
Potatoes  .888  .862  .235 .205  1.091  .225 .096  1.164 
   (.032)  (.015)  (.008) (.011) (.045) (.045) (.065) (.146) 
N  208,220  201,596   208,220      25,124   
 
 